1. Kamala Harris was dealt a difficult hand to play at the outset of her campaign. Thanks to Joe Biden she got into the race late by normal standards. Had Biden done what many expected him to do and taken himself out of a run for a second term early on, she would have, assuming she won the nomination, given herself time — roughly a year — to introduce herself and her vision to the American people. Yes, she was the Vice President, but that is hardly a high profile position. It can be a graveyard.
2. The economic headwinds for incumbents, which were severe across Europe and the U.S., put her at a disadvantage. While the post Covid economy had rebounded and gained strength in recent years, popular dissatisfaction persisted. Inflation abated, for example, but prices remained high. And people were confronted with that reality every time they went shopping for food or to the gas station. This pernicious dynamic translated into the undoing of many sitting governments across much of Europe. In nearly every case, by margins far exceeding those of Harris.
3. Biden’s historically low popularity hovering around 40 per cent, despite “notable” economic achievements, put her at a disadvantage as well. And while Kamala wasn’t the president, she was, as Vice President, fairly or unfairly, connected to these negative perceptions of the administration. If you doubt this, consider this counterfactual: if Biden’s popularity had been over 50 per cent, and if consumer prices had fallen back to pre-inflationary levels, and if employment levels remained more or less the same, and if wages continued to trend upward, and if she had a year to introduce herself to voters would the outcome been different?
4. In saying this I’m not suggesting that the awful stench of racism, misogyny, transphobia, and xenophobia would be of no consequence to the election’s outcome. To the contrary, I would argue that no matter what the circumstances they would be an integral part of an intertwined knot of attitudes and beliefs that shaped voter attitudes and choices before and on election day. As for the just completed election, it is too big a stretch for me to believe that the unconcealed, unrelenting, crude and unapologetic tropes offered up by Trump provoked only grins, laughter, high fives, and a desire to proudly wear a red hat, but didn’t deeply inform political perceptions and voter decisions.
I’m not a historian or sociologist, but it strikes me that to make such a claim flies in the face of historical experience. It smells like gaslighting. Or, said differently, it minimizes the most pernicious forms and effects of racism as well as misogyny, homo and transphobia, and xenophobia that have left an unmistakable mark on every aspect of American life, including voter attitudes. To give a little historical perspective, what accounts, for example, for the voting patterns in the South? What explains its political backwardness? Is there an explanation for the cast of characters in the Senate and House that Dixieland sends us every two and four years since our country’s founding that doesn’t include racism, not on its explanatory edges, but at its center?
Do we really believe as some suggest that Trump’s decision in the closing weeks of the campaign to double down on the most vile forms of racism and misogyny was of no consequence? While some of his advisors counseled otherwise, Trump, attuned to his audience and the larger dynamics of the election, ignored their advice and let loose an avalanche of the most dehumanizing invective, the likes of which haven’t been seen in modern presidential politics. Nothing close!
Indeed, there were no boundaries, no line beyond which he hesitated crossing. The viler the better. In his calculus, racist and misogynist, anti-immigrant and anti trans stereotyping and tropes that are at the core of his being would drum up votes. And, I believe, he was right. For much of his base, it was music to their ears. It gave voice and legitimacy to their unspoken thoughts and everyday utterances. To suggest that it didn’t play a significant role in mobilizing Trump voters, to suggest it has nothing to do with Harris’ defeat is not only mistaken, but profoundly dangerous.
5. The gender gap figured far less in the election’s outcome than many, including myself, hoped. The support among white women for Kamala turned out to be less than the polling suggested leading up to election day. Trump’s position on abortion didn’t prove to be his undoing among white women. Much the data would suggest that many who opposed any abortion ban turned around and cast their vote for Trump. As a result, Trump’s advantage among men wasn’t countered by the votes of women against him. This, along with his significant support from Latino men and a cohort of young men, especially young white men, was one of the tipping points in the election’s outcome.
6. Finally, Kamala offered in her political advertising and her numerous rallies — and she was indefatigable — a series of working class proposals, each of which would improve the lives of working people. Now one could quarrel whether they went far enough, whether they challenged corporate profits and governmental priorities enough. And I would. They were too timid in my view, not far reaching enough.
But to say that the Democratic Party and Kamala “abandoned” the working class and labor movement strikes me as political hyperbole that does nothing to help us understand the outcome of the elections nor prepare us for what lies ahead. Where is the evidence? One could argue, in fact, that the attention paid to “identity politics” was too muted by her as well as her supporters. If anybody doubled down on identity politics, if we want to get to the truth, it was Trump. And It was of the most vile kind with no precedent.
Truth is, as I see it, identity politics is another name in my book for the struggle for human and democratic rights. Moreover, the struggle for them is at the core of the struggle for working class and people’s unity. Ignore the former, forget about the latter.
